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For France as for many other EU member states, the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht represented the end of the ‘permissive 
consensus’ among the public, identified in the 1970s by 
the US scholar Ronald Inglehart.3 The European integration 
process left the sphere of the elites, becoming increasingly 
politicized. As a consequence, the EU has become more a 
matter of party competition and, not least, of party-internal 
splits. Also Euroscepticism has become more institutional-
ized, on both sides of the political spectrum. In France’s 
September 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, a 
small ‘yes’ (51%) won. Thirteen years later, in May 2005, the 
French people declared a firm ‘no’ (54%) to the European 
Constitutional Treaty.
Opposition to Europeanization has become increasingly 
routinized in elections and has helped to legitimize parties 
of both the far right and the far left. In the European elections 
of June 2014, the far right party, Front National, came in first, 
winning 23 seats of a total of 72. The Front National devel-
oped its campaign against French membership in the euro 
but also against a EU that was held to be killing off the wel-
fare state. It denounced the negative effects of globalization 
on the French labour market, where unemployment stood at 
10.4% in 2014. This discourse has an appeal for blue-collar 
workers who used to vote for left-wing parties. Denunciation 
of an EU which brings increased illegal migration, negatively 
affecting the welfare state, has been an additional argument 
used by the Front National.
Euroscepticism has left behind the Gaullist discourse on the 
preservation of national sovereignty to focus more exclu-
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In France, the push for the European integration process has 
come historically for a large part from the political and admin-
istrative elite. Over the past 60 years, they have expressed 
not only interest but also belief in European integration, as 
the US scholar Craig Parsons has rightly noted.1 Three beliefs 
about the EU have been recurrent fundamentals for French 
political and administrative elites:
1.  The EU must have a ‘core’ consisting in the major mem-
ber states which exercise a leadership on the rest. In this 
regard, France and Germany must share the role of motor 
or driving force.
2.  The EU must not be limited to a single market. It should 
develop as a political project including a foreign and 
security policy. This is usually called in France l’Europe 
puissance, a term difficult to translate. 
3.  The EU governance should be a combination of suprana-
tional and intergovernmental institutions.
The dramatic changes of 1989 in Europe clashed with these 
representations of the EU forged by the French elites. Several 
issues emerged after the reunification of Germany and the 
more general collapse of the Soviet bloc. Was this the end 
of the complementary asymmetry between Paris and Berlin 
(which replaced Bonn as the capital of a reunified Germany 
in 1990)? Is there a deep contradiction between l’Europe 
puissance and this rapid EU enlargement towards the East 
that will first favour a market-driven project?2 
1 Craig Parsons, A certain idea of Europe, Cornell University Press, 2003. 
2 Christian Lequesne, La France et la nouvelle Europe. Assumer le change-
ment d’échelle. Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 2008.
3 Ronald Inglehart, “Public Opinion and Regional Integration”, Internation-
al Organization, 24/04, Autum 1970, pp. 764-795. 
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sively on economic and social issues. This development is 
confronted by the firm realities of the welfare state. In 2014, 
55% of French GDP was still devoted to public spending, 
despite a public deficit and a public debt that exceed the 
thresholds allowed by the EU Treaties: 93.5% of GDP for the 
public debt (instead of the EU-stipulated 60%) and 4.2% of 
GDP for the public deficit (instead of 3%). 
These basic problems make the situation schizophrenic for 
any governing majority (left- or right-wing) in France. For 
a left-wing government, like the current Valls government, 
it is necessary to promise no drastic changes in the French 
welfare state, in order to win the election – and then, when 
in power, reduce public expenditures. For a right¬-wing gov-
ernment, there is the obligation to develop a discourse on 
financial rigour in order to win the elections, and then the 
difficulty of cutting public spending once in power. 
Any French government has to cope with the challenge of 
complying as much as possible with the EU convergence cri-
teria, without abandoning the national policies of the welfare 
state. This forces any French government to consider both the 
German discourse on Sparpolitik and the domestic discourse 
on the preservation of generous distributive policies (health-
care, retirement). It helps to explain why France has signed 
treaties like the Fiscal Compact introducing the Golden Rule 
into its domestic law and asks at the same time regularly 
for postponements in implementing its obligations. It puts 
France somewhere in the middle between the Northern and 
the Southern member states of the EU. On the Northern front, 
France has no other choice than to accept compromises with 
Germany, its primary trade partner, on the rationalization 
of public finances. On the Southern front, France regularly 
expresses its solidarity with the Mediterranean countries that 
have heavy public debts and deficits, and supports the prin-
ciple of financial transfers towards these countries – directly 
from the national budgets, or from the European Central 
Bank and the European Stability Mechanism.
The margin of manoeuver at the EU level for the Valls gov-
ernment is a very narrow one. There is no other alternative 
than to introduce unpopular reforms to bring the economy 
of France in line with its EU commitments. This means 
putting on the agenda questions like increasing flexibility for 
the job market, new reforms of the pension and healthcare 
systems, and corporate tax facilities for companies. In dis-
cursive terms, it means explaining to the people that France 
has ‘external’ constraints and that politics is not a matter of 
black and white between the left and the right, but requires 
consensus. This is what President Hollande and Prime Minis-
ter Valls are experiencing, in contrast to the idealistic legacy 
of the French Revolution that any good politics means a dual 
confrontation between two camps. It goes against the politi-
cal culture and explains the low support of the population 
towards President Hollande (14%), the Valls government 
(17%) and the established political parties (8%).4 The main 
risk of this strategy is of course the rise of the far-rightist Front 
National, which perpetuates the fiction that doing politics is 
a matter of voluntarism and not of consensus. It is difficult to 
say how many structural reforms the Valls Government will 
be able to implement in order to raise economic performance 
and to restore French credibility at the EU level. President 
Hollande and Prime Minister Valls have understood that 
turning their backs to the EU will be a form of economic sui-
cide. Despite the rise of the Front National, the fact remains 
that, in April 2014, only 26% of the French population felt in 
favour of leaving the Euro when 56% were against.5 
 
The difficulties of the French economy have worsened the gap 
with Germany which, ten years ago, was the ‘sick child’ of the 
EU economies but has recovered, following a series of major 
domestic reforms (the ‘Harz Laws’). Co-leading together with 
Germany has become more difficult. As French politicians 
have not renounced exercising a form of leadership within 
the EU, it has had to invest in another dimension: foreign and 
security policy. 
CFSP has always been considered by French political and 
administrative elites as a means to maximize national dip-
lomatic action. Participating in military interventions is 
consubstantial to the perception of an efficient diplomacy. 
The socialist President Hollande did not revise in 2012 his 
predecessor’s decision to reintegrate with the NATO Military 
Command that President De Gaulle had left in 1966. He 
insisted on having, in parallel, a more common defence 
strategy within the EU. This political goal is not easy to 
achieve, because of domestic as well as EU constraints. 
The main domestic constraint is the regular decrease of the 
French defence budget, which still represents 2% of GDP in 
2015. The EU constraint concerns the difficulty of moving 
forward on any new project for a European Defence Policy 
with the United Kingdom as the traditional partner in this 
field, because this partner comes with the difficult domestic 
debate on remaining in the EU or leaving it.
Paris can no longer limit the consolidation of the EU Defence 
Policy to a privileged partnership with London: alternative 
scenarios must be explored. The 2013 government White 
Book on Defence and National Security supports the idea of 
activating the relationships with Germany and Poland, in 
the defence field, together with other countries like Italy and 
Spain in a ‘Weimar Plus Triangle’.6 
4 http://www.bva.fr/data/sondage/sondage_fiche/1622/fichier_bva_-_
lobs_-_francois_hollande_-_bilan_de_mi-mandat75e6c.pdf
5 ht tp:// tempsreel .nouvelobs.com/pol i t ique/elect ions- europ -
eennes-2014/20140428.OBS5361/europeennes-56-des-francais-oppos-
es-a-la-disparition-de-l-euro.html
6 http://fr.calameo.com/read/000331627d6f04ea4fe0e
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On defence issues, France has not hesitated to intervene 
militarily in various configurations: with the NATO ‘coali-
tion of the willing’ in Libya (2011), alone against the Jihadi 
armed groups in Northern Mali (2013), with the US air force 
against Daesh in Iraq (2014). Starting with Sarkozy and con-
tinuing with Hollande, French governments have abandoned 
their pretention to distant their diplomacy from the USA in 
the Middle East. The negotiations on the future of the Iran 
Nuclear Plan are another example where France has acted 
as close ally of the USA. This marks a shift compare to the 
Gaullist paradigm of distancing from Washington. The main 
reason for this change is that France’s foreign policy, as in 
many Western democracies, is more and more concerned 
about the defence of global liberal values and not only 
national interests. Paradoxically, it is when the power of the 
West is declining at the international level that France has 
begun assuming a more explicit Western identity. 
The other reason is that France knows that conducting any 
efficient military operation outside Europe will be difficult 
without the material resources of the US Army. In September 
2013, French President Hollande had to abandon his plan 
of military invention against the regime in Syria because US 
President Obama decided –without any constitutional obli-
gation- to ask the Congress before committing US troops and 
got a negative reply.
France’s solidarity with the Western camp has been unshak-
able during the Ukrainian crisis. France agreed with
the USA and the EU partners to launch sanctions against
Putin’s Russia. President Hollande also agreed to delay the 
delivery to Russia of the helicopter-carrier Mistral, which 
had been negotiated in 2011 under the presidency of Nicolas 
Sarkozy. It appears increasingly likely that France will refund 
to Russia the advance payment rather than deliver the vessel. 
On the other hand, France – like Germany – is not in favour 
of additional sanctions against Russia at the moment. There 
is also no enthusiasm for supporting Ukrainian membership 
in NATO, to avoid the ‘politics of the worse’ with Putin.
France is a clear example of a state whose economic future 
is totally bound to the EU. Europeanization has become a 
concrete reality that any French government, leftist or right-
ist, cannot escape. Socialist President Hollande and Prime 
Minister Valls have launched several structural reforms of 
France’s economic policy under the strong constraints of 
its EU commitments. The process of domestic change has 
fuelled Euroscepticism, also within the government’s major-
ity. But even if Eurosceptics should get ruling responsibilities 
in the future, it is far from obvious that they will be in a posi-
tion to escape France’s EU commitments.
France exemplifies a two-level game model: what a member 
state decides at home directly influences its position in the 
EU, and what the EU decides directly influences the course of 
that state’s domestic policies and politics.
This is why, rather than a story of love, the EU has become a 
story of reason for France. However, domestic reforms shaped 
by the EU still depend on the French decision-making cul-
ture, where conflict still predominates over consensus. This 
is why reforms in France take longer time to be implemented 
than what some other EU partners (Germany in particular) 
often expect. 
There can be no doubt that France still aims to be reckoned 
among the leading EU member states. Given the considerable 
difficulties with its economic policy, French governments 
have tended to engage more actively in the sphere of foreign 
and security policy as a compensation strategy. 
France in 2015 is an active contributor to the cause of world 
peace, but it would like to find more committed allies in the 
EU. Cooperation is sometimes easier with the USA, and this 
is why France has been tending to follow more the US foreign 
policy line, in contradiction to the Gaullist legacy. Regarding 
the EU, French public opinion has not been vocal about gov-
ernmental activism on foreign and security issues. Clearly, it 
is economic and social policies that engage the attention of 
the French public and nourish the debate about the EU.
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